LA GUAIRA, Venezuela — The devastating earthquakes that struck Venezuela in June did more than expose weaknesses in the country’s buildings. They raised a much deeper question: why were thousands of people housed in structures built in areas that scientists had already identified as highly vulnerable to powerful earthquakes?
An investigation by The Washington Post found that Venezuelan authorities had identified areas at serious seismic risk years before the construction of many public-housing complexes. Yet the government proceeded with a huge housing program in some of those locations, driven in part by political promises to provide homes to people displaced by floods and other disasters.
The consequences became painfully clear when two powerful earthquakes struck on June 24.
Scientists had already identified the danger
Venezuela is no stranger to earthquakes.
After a magnitude-6.6 earthquake devastated parts of Caracas in 1967 and killed more than 225 people, the government strengthened its earthquake research and engineering systems. It created institutions dedicated to seismic research and developed building standards intended to make structures safer during major earthquakes.
Over subsequent decades, Venezuela developed seismic building codes that experts considered sophisticated by international standards.
The country's regulations were updated again in 2019. Michael Schmitz, a geologist at the Central University of Venezuela who worked for decades with the country's seismological foundation, told the Post that, in principle, buildings constructed under the post-2001 seismic standards should not have collapsed.
That makes the destruction of newer public housing particularly troubling.
The issue was not simply that Venezuela was unaware of earthquakes. Authorities had decades of scientific evidence showing where the greatest risks existed and how buildings should be designed to withstand them.
The housing program created enormous pressure
Under former President Hugo Chávez, Venezuela launched the Gran Misión Vivienda Venezuela, or Great Housing Mission Venezuela.
The ambitious program was designed to provide homes to large numbers of Venezuelans, particularly people displaced by flooding and other emergencies.
Beginning after 2011, large apartment complexes were constructed at a rapid pace.
The program became one of Chávez's most prominent political initiatives. Providing homes offered immediate relief to families while also demonstrating the government's promise to deliver social benefits on a massive scale.
But speed and location became critical issues.
Some of the new housing was built in places where scientists had already identified significant earthquake hazards.
The question now facing investigators is whether political and construction priorities were allowed to outweigh seismic safety.
The June earthquakes exposed the vulnerability
On June 24, Venezuela experienced an extraordinary sequence of earthquakes.
A magnitude-7.2 earthquake was followed only 39 seconds later by a magnitude-7.5 earthquake. Because the quakes were relatively shallow, the shaking was especially destructive.
Buildings collapsed in Caracas and along the country's Caribbean coast.
The disaster was particularly severe in La Guaira, including the city of Caraballeda.
The earthquakes killed thousands of people and displaced tens of thousands, according to Venezuelan authorities cited by the Post. Many people remained missing weeks after the disaster.
The destruction provided researchers with an unusually large real-world test of Venezuela's earthquake-resistant construction.
And the results were troubling.
Public housing appeared especially vulnerable
The Post analyzed satellite imagery of Caraballeda dating from before and after the earthquakes.
The analysis found a striking difference between newer high-density public housing and comparable privately developed buildings.
More than half of the highest-density buildings constructed under the Misión Vivienda program collapsed, according to the Post's analysis.
By comparison, only about one in 10 similar privately constructed buildings collapsed. Many of the private structures that did fail had been built under older seismic standards.
The finding does not mean every public-housing building was unsafe or that every private building was stronger.
Indeed, some public-housing projects reportedly survived with little or no structural damage.
But the concentration of collapses among particular newer developments raises questions that cannot easily be dismissed as the unavoidable result of an exceptionally powerful earthquake.
Building codes may not have been the only problem
Experts say having a modern building code is only the first step.
A structure can be designed according to a seismic standard but still be vulnerable if construction quality is poor, inspections are inadequate or the actual site conditions are not properly considered.
Venezuela's geography creates additional challenges.
Parts of Caracas and La Guaira sit on soft or sedimentary soils that can amplify earthquake shaking.
Researchers have previously warned that tall concrete buildings constructed on soft ground can be particularly vulnerable during violent earthquakes.
That means engineers must consider not only the strength of a building but also where it stands.
A structure that performs adequately on firm ground can experience much stronger movement when constructed over softer soils.
Construction oversight is now a central question
One of the biggest issues emerging from the disaster is enforcement.
Alejandro Linayo, a Venezuelan disaster-risk specialist quoted by the Post, said forensic engineering should determine whether collapsed buildings complied with the country's standards.
If the buildings failed because existing engineering knowledge was insufficient, the standards may need to be revised.
But if buildings failed because builders ignored existing requirements, he said there should be accountability.
That distinction could prove crucial.
If the regulations themselves were inadequate, Venezuela would need to rethink its seismic design requirements.
If the regulations were adequate but ignored, the problem would instead involve construction practices, inspection systems and government oversight.
Either way, simply rebuilding the same structures in the same way would leave communities vulnerable to another disaster.
The government disputes the idea that public housing performed worse
Interim President Delcy Rodríguez has argued that public housing did not necessarily perform worse than private housing.
After the disaster, she said she did not want to blame either public or private developments because the country had experienced a "double earthquake."
The Post's satellite analysis, however, points toward a different conclusion in Caraballeda.
The discrepancy between the government's characterization and the evidence identified by the newspaper is likely to intensify calls for independent structural investigations.
A presidential commission is evaluating damaged buildings, but the Post reported that there was no indication that the government was conducting a broader investigation into why supposedly earthquake-resistant public infrastructure failed at such high rates.
Reconstruction creates another risk
The disaster has now created an enormous reconstruction challenge.
The United States has committed more than $300 million to reconstruction efforts, according to the Post, while the U.S. State Department is working with engineering and disaster-risk firm Miyamoto International to evaluate buildings in Caracas and La Guaira.
That assistance could help Venezuela rebuild damaged communities.
But reconstruction also creates a critical opportunity.
Authorities must decide whether to replace destroyed buildings exactly where they stood, move vulnerable communities to safer locations or redesign structures to account for the lessons of the disaster.
Simply replacing collapsed apartments without understanding why they failed could reproduce the same risk.
Older buildings present another problem
The disaster does not mean that only Chávez-era housing is dangerous.
Venezuela has a large stock of older buildings constructed before modern seismic requirements were introduced.
Experts have warned that some older concrete structures were never retrofitted to withstand today's understanding of earthquake risk.
That leaves Venezuela facing two separate challenges.
First, it must determine whether newer buildings complied with modern standards.
Second, it must assess older buildings that were constructed before those standards existed.
Both groups can present serious risks during future earthquakes.
The geography cannot be ignored
The location of the destroyed buildings is another important part of the story.
La Guaira sits along Venezuela's Caribbean coast, close to active tectonic systems.
The June earthquakes occurred along the boundary between the Caribbean and South American plates, where the plates move laterally against one another.
Earthquakes are therefore not an unexpected phenomenon in the region.
The 1967 Caracas earthquake should have provided an enduring warning.
Instead, decades later, large numbers of people were still living in buildings and neighborhoods vulnerable to powerful shaking.
The disaster raises questions about political priorities
The housing program illustrates a difficult problem faced by governments around the world.
When thousands of families urgently need homes, officials face pressure to build quickly.
But earthquake-resistant construction can require additional engineering, careful site selection, stronger materials and rigorous inspections.
Those measures cost money and can slow construction.
For a government promising to house large numbers of people rapidly, there can be a temptation to prioritize the number of apartments completed over the resilience of those apartments.
The Venezuelan disaster demonstrates the potential consequences of that trade-off.
A home that is inexpensive and quickly built may satisfy a political promise — until the earthquake arrives.
What Venezuela must learn
The immediate priority is rescuing survivors, caring for displaced families and restoring essential services.
But the longer-term challenge is preventing the next earthquake from producing another catastrophe.
That means examining collapsed buildings one by one.
Investigators need to determine what materials were used, whether designs followed the applicable standards, whether construction matched approved plans and whether inspections were properly conducted.
They also need to examine soil conditions and the placement of buildings in relation to known seismic hazards.
Only a comprehensive investigation can establish whether the failures resulted from inadequate design, poor construction, weak oversight, dangerous locations or a combination of factors.
A warning written into the landscape
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Venezuelan disaster is that the danger was not unknown.
The country had experienced a devastating earthquake before.
Scientists had mapped seismic hazards.
Engineers had developed earthquake-resistant standards.
Officials knew that certain locations could experience severe shaking.
And yet, large-scale housing construction continued in vulnerable areas.
The June earthquakes turned those long-standing warnings into reality.
For the families who lost homes and loved ones, the question is no longer whether Venezuela should prepare for a major earthquake.
It is why the country was not better prepared when scientists had already warned that the buildings could fail.
As Venezuela begins rebuilding, the answer will determine whether the reconstruction becomes a genuine improvement in public safety — or simply a new generation of buildings waiting for the next major earthquake.
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